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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAYE SMITH CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, GRANITE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14497 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by a contractor (Jaye Smith 
Construction Company) to recover against the contracting 
authority (Granite School District) for money that the 
contractor claims is owed it under its contract with Granite 
School District. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On December 19, 1975, the District Court, in a 
Memorandum Decision (R. 61-62), held that plaintiff was 
entitled to a judgment against defendant in the amount of 
$4,992.24. On January 7, 1976, the District Court, with 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 63-65), entered 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgment against defendant in the amount of $4,992.24 plus 
interest in the amount of $715.54. (R. 70). On February 
20, 19 76, the District Court amended the judgment to reduce 
the amount of interest awarded from $715.54 to $599.06 
(R. 82-83). . x 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL • 
Appellant seeks to have the District Court's 
amended judgment reversed and to have judgment entered in 
appellant's favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 6, 19 7 3, at the offices of Granite School 
District, a bid opening session was conducted to determine 
the low bidder on a contract to build an addition to the 
Kearns Junior High School gymnasium (PX^/ 13). The bids, 
which were submitted in sealed envelopes, were opened by 
Mr. Davidson, Director of New School Facilities, and handed 
to Dr. Call. (Tr.^ y 54) . In addition to its bid proposal 
form (PX 10), the envelope of Jaye Smith Construction Company 
contained a letter signed by Mr. Jaye Smith stating: 
V As hereinafter used, "PX" means "plaintiff's exhibit" 
and "DX" means "defendant's exhibit." 
^f As hereinafter used, "Tr." refers to the transcript 
of testimony. 
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Due to the difficulty in determining price 
and availability of the three inch roof deck 
material specified. . ., I have submitted my 
proposal on the basis of a cost of 36 cents 
per square foot of roof area. I use this 
figure only as a basis for arriving at a 
total bid price, and stipulate a change in 
contract price, either higher or lower as the 
information becomes available. (PX 11). 
The evidence is clear that Granite School District officials 
were not made aware of the contents of this "contingency" 
letter during the bid opening session. Mr. Davidson testi-
fied that the "contingency" letter was not noticed at that 
time (Tr. 54); Dr. Call, in his affidavit, also claims that 
the letter was not noticed (R. 48). Mr. Smith, the president 
of plaintiff, also acknowledges that the contents of the 
letter were not brought up during the session,* although he 
claims a passing reference to the existence of the letter 
was made (Tr. 8). Plaintiff was second lowest bidder, and 
became low bidder when the previous low bidder asked to be 
and was allowed to withdraw its bid (Tr. 23-24, PX 13). 
After the session, when Mr. Smith met with the facilities 
representatives of Granite, no mention was made of the 
bid's contingent nature (Tr. 25). Immediately thereafter, 
V In a letter dated January 14, 1974 (DX 9) from Jaye Smith 
to Arthur Olsen, the architect assigned to the project, Smith 
stated that he was "sorry the letter was overlooked at the 
bid opening." 
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the Board of Education met and the following occurred: 
Dr. Call said that earlier this day, at 
5:30 p.m., construction bids were opened 
for the physical education additions at 
Kearns Junior High School. The low responsi-
ble bidder was Jaye Smith Construction Company,. 
with a bid of $164,022, and a completion date 
v; ; of August 10, 19 73. . . . Dr. Call made a 
recommendation that the Board award the bid 
to Jaye Smith Construction Company. (PX 14). 
Again, there was no mention whatever of any contingency in 
the bid made by plaintiff. (Id.). 
Two days later on March 8, 1973, Mr. Smith, on 
behalf of plaintiff, and Granite representatives met and 
formally signed the contract (PX 12), which provided in 
paragraph 11: 
The Board agrees to pay the contractor for the 
said work and materials and for the full per-
formance by the contractor of all covenants 
and conditions in the manner and form set out 
for the General Contract, including Plans & 
Specifications the sum of One Hundred Sixty 
Four Thousand Twenty Two ($164,022) dollars 
subject to additions and deductions as herein 
provided, and subject to the provisions of 
this Agreement,. 
Nowhere in the contract is there any mention of a contingency 
in the amount to be paid the contractor. Moreover, by 
plaintiff's own admission, no mention whatsoever of a con-
tingent bid was made during the meeting in which Mr. Smith 
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signed the contract.V
 I t w a s n o t until approximately six 
weeks later that Mr. Davidson discovered the existence of 
the letter. This occurred after Mr. Davidson heard about 
the possible contingency and checked the bid envelope, 
(Tr. 58). 
At trial, counsel for Granite School District objected 
strenuously to the admission of evidence extraneous to the 
contract. The evidence was admitted and the court granted 
Granite a continuing objection to such evidence. (Tr. 2,4). 
jV The transcript contains the following interchange 
between counsel for appellant and Mr. Smith: 
Q. On March 8, 1973 was there any discussion at that 
time with Mr. Davidson as to the contingency in 
your bid for the roof decking amount? 
A. No, there wasn't. 
Q. Did you in fact sign the contract on March 8th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you sign it in the amount of 
$164,022.00? 
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Granite School District personnel have consistently refused 
to sign any change order allowing plaintiff to receive funds 
for the wood decking material beyond the amounts provided for 
in the contract. (Tr. 60). In April of 1974, several months 
after the job was completed, Mr. Olsen, the architect assigned 
to the project, signed a change order. Granite School District, 
the owner, did not sign the change order (PX 2 0) . 
: , . \ ARGUMENT 
v POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONSIDERING " 
EVIDENCE ANTECEDENT TO THE CONTRACT WHICH WAS ADMITTED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF VARYING OR CONTRADICTING THE WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
A. There is No Evidence Indicating that Granite Assented 
to the Terms of the "Contingency" Letter. 
Finding of Fact No. IV of the District Court states: 
Court finds that the letter written by the 
plaintiff was with the bid and it was present 
at the bid opening. That the same was noticed 
• by agents of the defendant, or should have 
been, in the exercise of reasonable care in 
the examination of the bids. (R. 6 4) (Emphasis 
added). 
• • . " j 
Finding No. V states: 
Court finds that the qualification letter 
was part of plaintiff's bid and became part 
of the contract executed by parties. . .(Id.). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By its terms, Finding IV is not a finding by the court that 
Granite representatives were aware of the contents of "con- • 
tingency" letter; on the contrary, the court's conclusion 
that they should have noticed it clearly indicates an un-
willingness by the court to conclude that Granite representa-
tives in fact noticed the letter. Furthermore, by concluding 
in its memorandum opinion that "before the work was completed 
they [Granite] did learn of the letter," the court again 
indicates an unwillingness to conclude that Granite was 
aware of the letter prior to signing the contract. 
The error in the district court's findings is its 
basing a contractual obligation on the fact that the letter 
"should have been [noticed] in the exercise of reasonable 
care." Contractual obligations do not arise out of negligence; 
rather, a contract can be found only where the parties there-
to mutually assent .to its terms: 
The principle is fundamental that a party cannot 
be held to have contracted if there is no assent, 
and this is so both as to express contracts and 
contracts implied in fact. There must be mutual 
assent or a meeting of the minds on all essential 
elements or terms in order to form a binding 
contract. 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §18, at 354 (1964). Thus, the 
court's absolute failure to find mutual assent to the terms 
of contingency letter is fatal to the court's finding 
that the letter "became a part of the contract." This is 
-7-
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especially so in light of the failure of Mr. Smith to bring 
the contingency up in the meeting following the bid opening 
and at the time the contract was signed. 
B. Even if Granite Representatives were Aware of the 
Terms of the Contingency Letter any Evidence with 
Respect Thereto is Barred by the Parol Evidence 
Rule. 
The parol evidence rule has been stated as follows: 
When two parties have made a contract and 
have expressed it in a writing to which both 
have assented as the complete and accurate 
integration of the contract, evidence, 
whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent 
understandings and negotiations will not be 
admitted for the purpose of varying or con-
tradicting the writing. 
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §573, at 357 (1960). The 
parol evidence rule is clearly the law of the State of Utah. 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 
(1972); Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769 
(1969); Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 376, 323 P.2d 
259 (1958); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 
2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957); Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 
143 P.2d 281 (Utah 1943). The first essential under the parol 
evidence rule is that the written contract be integrated. 
This court, in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, supra explained 
the requirements of an integrated contract: 
An essential element of an integration is 
that the parties shall have manifested 
assent not meresly to the provisions of their 
agreement but to the writing or writings in 
question as a final statement of their 
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intentions as to the matters contained 
therein. Whether a document was or was 
not adopted as an integration may be proved 
by any relevant evidence. 
501 P.2d at 270. The relevant evidence in this case with re-
gard to this issue is as follows: Granite representatives 
were not aware of the contingent nature of the bid (the 
uncontradicted evidence shows that, under its bid policies, 
had Granite been aware of the contingency, the bid would have 
been rejected (Tr. 55, 75-76)), and Mr. Smith never mentioned, 
either after the bid session or when the contract was signed, 
the contingent bid to Granite officials. Thus, at the time 
the contract was signed there was nothing to evidence any 
intent by either party that the written contract was not the 
full and complete agreement between them. The best evidence 
of the intent of the parties comes "from the four corners of 
the instrument itself." Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Bybee, supra 306 P.2d at 775. As quoted above, paragraph 11 
of the contract is clear and unequivocal as to the amount 
to which the contractor was entitled; nowhere in paragraph 
11 or elsewhere in the contract is any contingency mentioned 
regarding the wood decking materials. There is absolutely 
no evidence in this case to indicate that the contract signed 
by the parties was not a fully integrated contract. Whether 
Mr. Smith subjectively felt that the contingency should be . 
part of the contract, he must be bound by his objective 
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manifestation of assent to the terms of the written contract. 
Once it is determined that a contract is integrated, 
the following rule of law comes into effect: 
[W]hen parties have reduced to writing what 
appears to be a complete and certain agree-
ment, it will be conclusively presumed, in 
the absence of fraud, that the writing con-
tains the whole of the agreement between the 
parties; and that parol evidence of con-
temporaneous conversations, representations 
or statements will not be received for the 
purpose of varying or adding to the terms 
of the written agreement.. 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, supra, 501 P.2d at 270 
(emphasis added),. Since the contingency letter was obviously 
offered to vary the unambiguous terms of paragraph 11 of 
the contract, the court clearly erred in allowing the ad-
mission of such evidence. One of the best statements of 
the policies behind the parol evidence rule is found in a 
19 58 opinion of this Court, Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, supra. 
In that case, defendant received delivery of a car from 
plaintiff, paid plaintiff a $200 check, and signed a conditional 
sales contract. Later, defendant stopped payment on the 
check. The next day, however, defendant signed another 
conditional sales contract containing "clear, complete terms, 
including the price." Defendant paid nothing on the car, 
which was subsequently repossessed. Responding to defendant's 
contentions that the contract was cancelled, that he meant 
to enter a different contract, and that he didn't execute 
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the contract, the Court stated: 
[H]is testimony was diametrically opposed 
to the manifestation of mutual assent re-
flected in his execution of an instrument 
whose terms were clear, unambiguous, 
understandable and known. 
Elementary it is that in construing contracts 
we seek to determine the intentions of the 
parties. But is is also elementary and of 
extreme practical importance that we hold 
contracting parties to their clear and 
understandable language deliberately committed 
to writing and endorsed by them as signatories 
thereto. Were this not so business, one with 
another among our citizens, would be rele-
gated to the chaotic, and the basic purpose • 
of the law to supply enforceable rules of 
conduct for the maintenance and improvement 
of an orderly society's welfare and progress 
would find itself impotent. It is not un-
reasonable to hold one responsible for 
language which he himself espouses. Such 
language is the only implement he gives us 
to fashion a determination as to the intentions 
of the parties. Under such circumstances we 
should not be required to embosom any request 
that we ignore that very language. This is 
as it should be. The rule excluding matters 
outside the four corners of a clear, under-
standable document, is a fair one, and 
one's contentions concerning his intent 
should extend no further than his own clear 
expressions. 
It was urged correctly that to admit 
matters outside a contract would do vio-
lence to the principle that one is bound 
by his manifestations of assent, and that, 
irrespective of such contention, such 
matters properly are excludable by the 
parol evidence rule,—which rule, counsel 
suggests, is one of substantive law rather 
than one of evidence. Whatever kind one 
calls it, the rule that excludes such 
evidence is a common sense rule. 
323 P.2d at 260-61 (Emphasis added). Similarly in the instant 
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case, the contract terms were "clearf unambiguous, under-
standable and known." As such, this Court should again "hold 
contracting parties to their clear understandable language 
deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them as 
signatories thereto." Appellant submits that prejudicial 
error was committed by the District Court in admitting the 
evidence as to the contingent nature of the bid and that the 
judgment should therefore be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE CHANGE ORDER SIGNED BY ARTHUR OLSEN IN APRIL 1974*IS 
NOT BINDING UPON GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
A. The Change Order is Clearly Invalid Since the Owner 
Has Never Approved "it. 
One of plaintiff's claims at trial was that a change 
order (PX 20) signed by the architect assigned to- the project 
was binding upon Granite School District, thus requiring 
Granite to pay plaintiff for the extra cost of the wood 
decking. The District Court did not rule on this issue, 
either in its Memorandum Decision (R. 61-62) or its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 63-65). Nevertheless, 
appellant will address this issue on appeal since it is clear 
as a matter of law that the change order is not binding on 
Granite School District. The change order presented in 
evidence by plaintiff (PX 20) contains the following signa-
tory sec'.'.'jn: 
-12-
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Arthur K. Olsen 
Architect 
357 East 5th South 
Address 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
By / s / Arthur K. Olsen 
Date: April 26, 1974 
Jaye Smith Const., Inc. 
Contractor 
3299 Msadowbrook Drive 
Address 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84119 
By / s / Jaye B. Smith 





The change o r d e r was not and has never been s igned by t h e owner 
of the p r o p e r t y . Thus, on the face of t h e document i t . i s 
i ncomple te . Moreover, t he un rebu t t ed ev idence of Mr. Davidson 
and Mr. H i l t o n , t h e p r e s e n t D i r e c t o r of F a c i l i t i e s / shows t h a t 
the p r a c t i c e in Gran i t e School D i s t r i c t i s t h a t every change 
o r d e r must be approved by the a s s i s t a n t s u p e r i n t e n d e n t and 
s igned by a Gran i t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e as we l l a s t h e a r c h i t e c t 
(Tr. 50, 76 ) . More i m p o r t a n t l y , p l a i n t i f f ' s p r e s i d e n t has 
admi t t ed t h a t both the a r c h i t e c t and owner a r e involved i n 
de te rmin ing whether e x t r a funds w i l l be approved: 
Q. And t h a t i s , of c o u r s e , in May of 1973. 
You d i d n ' t b e l i e v e i t was a change o r d e r 
- expense? You b e l i e v e i t was a d d i t i o n a l 
expense t o the c o n t r a c t , d i d n ' t you? 
A. Frankly t he a r c h i t e c t and owner dec ide how 
t h e s e d i f f e r e n t l i t t l e w r i n k l e s a r e t o be 
handled . 
(Tr. 40) (Emphasis added) . Absent t he s i g n a t u r e of t he 
owner ' s a u t h o r i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , the change o r d e r should 
be he ld i n v a l i d . 
- 1 3 -
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B. Both the Contractor and Architect Were Aware, At the 
Time of the April 19 74 Change Order", That the Architect 
Was Not Authorized to Bind Granite School District:• 
As a legal matter, it is clear that the architect 
was powerless to bind the appellant via the April 19 74 change 
order. The contract in this case outlines specific powers of 
the architect over various matters yet clearly does not authorize 
the architect to bind Granite as to change orders. Such situatic 
are governed by the rule that "specific authorization of par-
ticular acts tends to show that a more general agency is not 
intended." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 37(2) (1958). 
Moreover, both the architect and contractor were 
aware of this lack of power, as the exhibits clearly demonstrate 
In DX 8, a letter from Olsen, the architect, to Davidson, dated 
January 8, 19 74, Olsen clearly recognizes the need for approval 
by someone other than himself: !l[T]he wood decking is an item 
that will need to be resolved at a meeting with the appropriate 
Granite School District representatives.° This is further 
demonstrated by PX 17, a letter from Davidson to Olsen dated 
January 10, 1974, in which Davidson makes it very clear that 
the decision whether to pay plaintiff was not one to be made 
by Olsen. Moreover, it is also clear that Smith was aware 
that Olsen was not authorized to bind Granite by virtue of 
fact that Smith had read Davidson's letter to Olsen. In PX 
18, a letter from Smith to Olsen, Smith refers to the contents 
-14-
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of Davidson's letter. Smith also stated in testimony that 
he saw the January 10 letter and was aware that Granite was 
not going to authorize the payment. (Tr. 36-37). Therefore, 
because of its knowledge to the contrary, plaintiff cannot 
claim that it believed that Olsen was authorized to issue 
the April 1974 change order. 
C. The Change Order, Even if Validly Executed, is Unenforce-
able Since it is Not Supported by Consideration. 
As discussed supra, the change order relied upon 
by plaintiff was executed months subsequent to the completion 
of the project. Plaintiff had fully performed its obligations 
with regard to the additions to the junior high gymnasium. 
Under the law of contracts, a contract may be super-
seded or modified by another contract (such as a change order). 
However, the law is clear that 
a new agreement by the parties to an older one, al-
tering, canceling, supplementing, or supplanting 
their former compact, in order to be valid, requires 
some consideration. Where a written contract is, 
by a later contract, altered or modified in some 
of its terms, the later contract must be founded 
upon some valid consideration. 
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 460, at 926-27 (1964). What does 
or does not constitute sufficient consideration is further 
analyzed in the same treatise: 
[I]t is generally held that there is insufficient 
consideration in the absence of • . . reciprocity 
of consideration. Each party must gain or lose some-
thing by the change. If the benefit or detriment 
is unilateral, a consideration is lacking, for it 
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is a well established legal principle that doing 
or undertaking to do only that which one is already 
under a legal obligation to do by his contract is 
no consideration for another's agreement to do 
what he is not already under a legal obligation to 
<io. 
Id. § 461, at 927-28 (emphasis added). In this case, Granite 
could receive nothing more than it had already received under 
the contract. Any benefit derived from the change order was 
necessarily unilateral. Thus, under the legal principles 
articulated above, the change order was without consideration 
and therefore unenforceable. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT AFTER TRIAL HAD BEGUN. 
At trial, after evidence had been presented, plain-
tiff sought to amend its complaint to include a claim that 
defendant had improperly withheld payment from plaintiff for 
extra costs incurred in striping the basketball floor at 
Kearns Junior High School. This request was granted over . 
defendant's objection (Tr. 18-19) and the Court ultimately 
granted judgment.for. plaintiff on this claim in the amount of 
$150. Granite was neither prepared to present evidence on or 
to defend against plaintiff's allegations regarding this claim. 
Defendant was prepared regarding the issues raised by plaintiff1 
complaint—namely, whether Granite was liable for the added co^c 
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of the decking material. Plaintifffs complaint (R. 1-2), 
which was filed on September 12, 19 74, made no claim whatever 
on the striping question, nor was any discovery had on this 
issue. AS such, defendant was completely surprised and pre-
judicially affected by the Court's allowing plaintiff to amend 
its complaint after trial had begun. 
Although it is freely conceded that Rule 15(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend 
pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires," 
such liberality cannot operate to the prejudice of another 
party. Indeed, one of the primary purposes of pleading is to 
prevent surprise at trial. In Porter v. Shoemaker, 6 F.R.D. 
438 (M.D. Pa. 1947), for example, the court was construing the 
purposes of pleading under the Federal Rules (after which the 
Utah rules are patterned), and had this to say: 
The whole theory with respect to the functions of 
pleading is changed. Under the equity practice the 
function was to plead facts and to frame the issues. 
Under the new rules, the purpose of the pleadings 
is to give notice of what an adverse party may ex-
pect to meet. The broadening of the discovery rules 
and other pretrial procedure is designed to define 
the issues and obtain the facts.". 
Id. at 440 (Emphasis added). Thus, unless an adverse party 
is notified of the claims of the other party, the whole pur-
pose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is subverted. 
The case law in the United States is unanimous in 
its conclusion that the liberal rule regarding amendment of 
pleadings must be weighed against the possible prejudicial 
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effect such liberality can have on an opposing party. In 
Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1968), 
just prior to trial (and four years after the initial answer 
was filed) the defendant attempted to amend its answer to 
raise a statute, of limitations defense. In holding that the 
defendant could not be allowed to amend at that late date, 
the court reasoned: 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) requires that leave to amend 
the pleadings be granted freely "when justice so 
requires." At the same time, it is clear that such 
leave should be denied where the amendment would 
(
 cause substantial prejudice to a party to the action. 
Id. at 1155 (Emphasis added). See also Jackson City Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Blair, 333 Mich. 399, 53 N.W. 2d 493 (1952), 
where the court held that "only those amendments should be 
allowed which do not work to the surprise or disadvantage of 
the adverse party." Finally, in summarizing the law regarding 
amendment of pleadings, a well known treatise stated: 
The court will ordinarily refuse to grant its 
permission to amend a pleading where the motion 
comes too late and in such circumstances that the 
rights of the adverse party will necessarily be 
prejudicially affected. J 
61 Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 314, at 720 (1972). Because Granite 
School District was not apprised in any manner prior to trial 
that claims relating to the basketball striping would be liti-
gated, it is clear that it was surprised at trial and thereby 
prejudicially affected. A fundamental tenet of our judicial 
system is that a party be given time to prepare its case; this 
-18-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was not done with regard to the plaintiff's striping claim. 
As such, this court should hold that the District Court erred 
in allowing plaintiff to amend. 
CONCLUSION 
Bidding procedures by their very nature require that 
the bidder make a firm statement of the amount for which he is 
willing to do a particular project. If contingent bids were 
allowed, it would become difficult, if not impossible to deter-
mine who the real low bidder actually is. In the instant case, 
for example, if plaintiff were awarded the extra $4,842.25 it 
claims, its actual bid.will be $168,864.25, or $1878.25 over 
the bid of Dean Cannon Construction Company (PX 13). This ob-
viously creates a very unfair situation to bidders in the posi-
tion of Cannon Construction Company. Furthermore, as Mr. 
Davidson stated in this regard, "[ijf we allow things like 
this to crop into our bidding then the question of who was 
the low bidder just becomes a circus because every contractor 
has some problems when it comes to bidding a job." (PX17). 
Granife School District respectfully urges this Court 
to reverse the trial court's award of judgment to plaintiff 
on the following grounds: 
(1) The trial court committed prejudicial 
error in admitting antecedent evidence which was offered 
for the purpose of varying the terms of an integrated 
contract between the parties. 
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as a 
(2) The change order signed by Mr. Olsen is. 
matter of law, not binding on Granite School District. 
(3) The trial court committed prejudicial error 
in allowing plaintiff to amend its complaint after trial 
had commenced. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
By M- &?>*** FTJJYA 
M. Byr,6n Fisher 
Ted D. Smxth 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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